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INFLATION AND TAX EVASION: 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Steven E. Crane and Farrokh Nourzad* 
Abstract-This paper contains an analysis of the effect of 
inflation on aggregate tax evasion in the United States over the 
period 1947-81. It is found that tax evasion in both absolute 
and relative terms is positively related to the inflation rate. 
Further, the results indicate that aggregate evasion has risen in 
both absolute and relative terms with increases in the marginal 
tax rate, but has fallen with increases in the detection probabil-
ity, the penalty rate, and the wage share of income. Finally, 
evasion has risen in absolute terms but has fallen in relative 
terms when real true income has risen. 
I. Introduction 
S IN CE the seminal work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) the literature on tax evasion 
has grown significantly.1 Most studies have in-
volved analysis of the evasion decision in the 
context of models with constant prices. In a recent 
contribution Fishburn (1981) has developed a the-
oretical model of evasion which incorporates the 
general price level. However, the static nature of 
Fishburn's analysis precluded him from consider-
ing the possibility that the rate of inflation may 
also influence the evasion decision. Yet the preva-
lence of cost-of-living adjustment clauses which 
are based on the inflation rate, together with the 
bracket-creep effect that may result suggest that 
such a relationship is likely to exist. Unfor-
tunately, there has been no research addressing 
this possibility. 
From a policy perspective, it is important that 
the nature of the relationship between the inflation 
rate and evasion be explored. For example, it has 
been argued that inflation is a nonlegislated tax 
increase which enhances government revenues. But 
if tax evasion is positively related to the inflation 
rate, the net effect of inflation on tax revenues may 
not be as significant as is generally believed. More-
over, a positive relationship may have implications 
for tax compliance policies in that the tax authori-
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1 The early work includes Srinivasan (1973) and Yitzhaki 
(1974). More recent work, including that by Christiansen (1980) 
and Koskela (1983), represents extensions of, and variations on 
the same theme. 
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ties may, depending upon implementation costs, 
want to intensify their compliance effort during 
periods of inflation. 
In this paper we conduct an empirical investiga-
tion of the relationship between inflation and a 
measure of aggregate income tax evasion in the 
United States over the period 1947-81. In the 
process, evidence regarding the effect of the other 
major determinants of evasion is provided. Our 
approach is as follows. In the next section we 
briefly review the findings of the theoretical litera-
ture on income tax evasion, and offer our rationale 
foir including the inflation rate in a model of 
evasion. In section III, an aggregate, empirically 
testable model of tax evasion is specified. Section 
IV contains the results from estimating two ver-
sions of this model. In the final section some 
concluding comments and suggestions for further 
research are offered. 
II. Major Determinants of Income 
Tax Evasion 
The standard approach to analyzing tax evasion 
has been to use a decision-under-uncertainty 
framework to determine how a risk-averse or a 
risk:neutral individual's evasion decision is affected 
by various factors. Typically, the taxpayer is as-
sumed to choose either the level or the proportion 
of income that is to be underreported, given (1) 
the detection probability, (2) the penalty rate to 
which evaders will be subjected if detected, (3) the 
tax rate, and (4) the level of true income. Recently, 
Fishburn (1981) has incorporated the general price 
level into the standard model. 2 
In most cases, negative relationships have been 
established between underreporting and both the 
penalty rate and the probability of detection. This 
is because increasing either of these compliance 
policy tools reduces expected income for a risk-
neutral individual, or expected utility of income 
2 Other factors have been analyzed, such as fairness of the 
fiscal system (e.g., Spicer and Becker, 1980). In addition, work 
has been done in a more general framework which considers 
the tax avoidance possibilities (e.g., Cross and Shaw, 1982), and 
the taxpayer's labor supply decision (e.g., Sandmo, 1981). 
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218 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
for a risk-averse individual. As a result, some have 
argued that these two policy instruments are sub-
stitutes. 
In contrast, multiple results have been obtained 
regarding the effect of the tax rate on evasion. 
Comparative static analysis of this effect reveals a 
positive or a negative response. This is because a 
change in the tax rate generates a substitution 
effect and an income effect. 
The substitution effect of a tax rate increase 
results in higher evasion, since with higher tax 
rates evasion is more profitable on the margin. The 
income effect, however, depends on attitude to-
wards risk. As higher tax rates reduce disposable 
income, the effect on evasion depends on whether 
risk aversion increases or decreases as income de-
creases. Under Arrow's Hypothesis that absolute 
risk aversion increases as income decreases the 
income effect results in lower evasion. In this case, 
the total effect of a tax rate increase is, a priori, 
ambiguous due to opposing income and substitu-
tion effects. 
If the income effect is dominated by the sub-
stitution effect, higher tax rates lead to increased 
evasion, even if Arrow's Hypothesis holds. Thus, 
this hypothesis is a necessary condition only for a 
negative relationship between tax rates and eva-
sion. Further, if absolute risk aversion is indepen-
dent of income or an increasing function of in-
come, there are no contradictory effects. 3 
Turning to the effect of changes in true income, 
the result depends on attitude towards risk and the 
choice of the measure of evasion. With a few 
exceptions, increases in true income lead to reduc-
tions in the proportion of income underreported. 4 
This holds regardless of the assumptions made 
about the nature of the other determinants of 
evasion. But, when risk aversion is assumed, the 
result depends on the properties of the relevant 
risk-aversion function. 
For example, Fishburn (1981) has shown that 
with a progressive tax function, a' penalty function 
based on evaded taxes, and Arrow's Hypotheses of 
increasing relative and decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, increases in true income result in reduc-
tions in the proportion of income underreported. 
3 Yitzhaki (1974) argues that as long as penalties are levied on 
evaded taxes rather than evaded income there is no ambiguity 
because there is no substitution effect. 
4 Examples of exceptions include Srinivasan's (1973) Corollary 
21 and Fishbum's (1981) Special Cases I and II. 
This has also been shown to hold (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972; Fishburn, 1981) even if the underly-
ing tax structure is assumed to be proportional, 
provided relative risk aversion is an increasing 
function of income. This result is also obtained 
(Srinivasan, 1973) for a risk-neutral individual un-
der proportional taxes, probability of detection 
that is an increasing function of true income, and 
progressive penalties imposed on evaded income. 
Some general statements can also be made in 
the case of the level of unreported income. Under 
decreasing absolute risk aversion a positive rela-
tion from true income to the level of unreported 
income is expected. This, coupled with the above 
finding regarding the proportion of income un-
derreported, indicates that increases in true in-
come lead to less than proportionate increases in 
the level of underreporting. 
Having discussed the determinants common to 
most models, we now consider the effect of infla-
tion. One way inflation can affect the decision to 
evade is by eroding the real value of a given level 
of nominal disposable income. This provides an 
incentive for the taxpayer to restore his/her 
purchasing power through evasion. This price-level 
effect is what Fishburn (1981) has analyzed. He 
has found that while a risk-neutral individual's 
evasion decision is independent of the price level, 
that of a risk-averse individual depends on the 
properties of the relative risk-aversion function. 
Further, the observed proportion of true income 
that is underreported by a risk-averse individual is 
a nondecreasing (nonincreasing) function of the 
price level if relative risk aversion is an increasing 
( decreasing) function of income. 
However, because Fishburn uses a static frame-
work in which nominal before-tax income is as-
sumed constant, he is unable to consider another 
way inflation can affect evasion. 5 In a dynamic 
world where nominal before-tax income can change 
in response to inflation, the rate of change of 
prices can also affect the evasion decision. For 
example, under a nonindexed progressive tax sys-
tem, even if cost-of-living adjustments cause nomi-
nal income to rise at the same rate as inflation so 
5 Fishburn actually assumes a constant nominal disposable 
income. But this assumes either a constant nominal before-tax 
income or a 100% tax rate. Given that the tax rate is less than 
100%, the assumption of constancy of nominal disposable 
income reduces to the assumption of constancy of nominal 
before-tax income. 
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that real before-tax income remains unchanged, 
real after-tax income may still fall as inflation 
pushes taxpayers into higher tax brackets. Thus, 
through the bracket-creep effect, the inflation rate 
can have a bearing on the decision to evade. Of 
course, the actual response of taxpayers depends 
on their attitudes towards risk. If risk aversion 
increases with real disposable income, a positive 
relationship between the rate of inflation and eva-
sion may be expected. 
To summarize, the major determinants of eva-
sion can be incorporated into the following im-
plicit evasion function: 
Z = f(D, F, TR, Y, P) (1) 
where Z is a measure of tax evasion, D is the 
probability of detection, F is the fine rate, TR is 
the tax rate, Y is real true income, and P is the 
inflation rate. A negative relationship is expected 
between Z and both D and F. However, theoreti-
cal analysis has been unable to establish a unique 
relationship between Z and the other explanatory 
variables. Therefore, pending additional theoreti-
cal developments, these relationships are empirical 
issues. 
III. An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion 
Aggregate empirical analysis of tax evasion re-
quires specification of (1) in terms of an em-
pirically testable equation, and quantification of 
its arguments using aggregate measures. We begin 
by postulating the following equation: 
Zit= a 0 + a 1D1_ 0 , 1, 2 + a 1 F; + a 3TR 1 
+ a4 ln r; + a5P1 + a6S1 + a 7t + [li (2) 
where S represents an institutional factor reflect-
ing income from sources that are difficult to con-
ceal, U is the random disturbance term, and all 
other notations are as defined previously. Equa-
tion (2) is a logarithmic transformation of a rela-
tion reflecting nonlinearities in the income variable 
that may arise from risk-averse behavior. In this 
equation, i = 1, 2 refers to two different specifica-
tions of the dependent variable, t is an annual 
time index, and t - 0, 1, 2 denotes the moving 
average of the current, one-year, and two-year 
lagged values of D. 
In this equation the variable which is most 
difficult to quantify is the dependent variable, Z;, 
measuring tax evasion. This is primarily because 
evasion is not a directly observable phenomenon. 
Four approaches have been used to generate 
estimates of evasion. These are (1) auditing tax 
returns to detect unreported income, (2) compar-
ing "true" and observed labor force participation 
rates to determine the extent of "off-the-record" 
activity, (3) following the traces that evasion leaves 
in monetary aggregates, and (4) analyzing the dis-
crepancies between income measures derived from 
national income accounts and those derived from 
tax return data. Each procedure suffers from 
shortcomings which have been discussed in Frey 
and Pommerehne (1982). 
After examining the available estimates, we 
chose to base our dependent variable on a measure 
obtained from the fourth procedure. This is the 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Gap, which is the 
difference between the AGI figure derived by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and that 
reported by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
The former is a proxy for reportable income while 
the latter is income actually reported to the IRS. 
Thus the Gap may be viewed as an approximation 
of aggregate unreported income, and consequently 
a rough indicator of the extent of evasion. How-
ever, we modify the AGI Gap as discussed below. 
We base our dependent variable on the Income 
Gap, in part, because of data availability. We 
believe that it is more appropriate to examine the 
effect of inflation on evasion over time. This re-
quires time-series data spanning a period of suffi-
cient length. Unfortunately, the measures based on 
the other procedures do not meet this requirement.6 
This choice was also influenced by our belief 
that some of the most important weaknesses of the 
Gap can either be overcome, or need not introduce 
serious distortions into our analysis. For example, 
a major shortcoming of the AGI Gap is that it 
treats income of those not legally required to file 
returns as evaded income. To alleviate this prob-
lem, we adjust the AGI Gap by removing from it 
an imputed value of the AGI of those not required 
to file tax returns. To accomplish this, we follow 
an approach used by Goode (1976). This involves 
using exemption data to estimate the percentage of 
6 The IRS underreporting estimates based on the Tax Com-
pliance Measurement Program are perhaps the most reliable 
figures. But they are only available for selected years. On the 
other hand, time-series estimates based on the monetary ag-
gregate approach are available (e.g., Tanzi, 1982). But since 
these are obtained from an econometric model which includes 
some of the explanatory variables used here, it would not be 
appropriate to use them. 
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the population not covered by tax returns, and 
assuming that the income of this group equals, on 
average, that reported on nontaxable returns. 
Hereafter, this modified Gap is referred to as the 
Adjusted Gap. 
Another potential problem with using an eva-
sion estimate based on the AGI Gap is that na-
tional income estimates are partially dependent 
upon the income reported on tax returns. This 
means that unreported income may also not ap-
pear in the national income estimates. However, 
since only a small fraction (e.g., about 6% in 1976, 
according to Parker (1982)) of national income is 
based on tabulations from tax returns, this should 
not create serious problems. 
A further weakness of the Income Gap is its 
failure to account for all income from under-
ground activities. Thus, the Gap tends to under-
estimate the true extent of the problem. But this 
does not preclude our use of the Adjusted Gap. 
Rather, it suggests that this measure is a lower 
bound estimate. Therefore, we use the Adjusted 
Gap as our measure of the level of underreporting, 
Z 1. It is also used to calculate the other specifica-
tion of evasion, the proportion of income underre-
ported, Z2 • 
We are now in a position to quantify the inde-
pendent variables in (2). 
Probability of Detection, D: For this we use the 
moving average of the current, one-year, and two-
year lagged values of the percentage of total tax 
returns audited each year by the IRS. The reason 
for using this moving average is as follows. An 
individual's subjective evaluation of the detection 
probability may, in part, depend on whether 
he/she knows someone who has been audited 
recently. This, in turn, is assumed to be a positive 
function of the percentage of total returns audited. 
Theory suggests that a negative relationship be-
tween D and both Z1 and Z2 should be expected. 
Fine Rate, F: Because the U.S. Tax Code 
specifies different fines for different types of 
offenses, no single statutory fine figure can be 
used. Therefore, we use the ratio of the additional 
taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS 
during the year in question, to the amount of taxes 
evaded. 7 The fines are expressed as a percentage of 
7 Note that unlike our measure of the detection probability, 
our fine rate is completely contemporaneous. The reason for 
this is that while the former is an attempt to capture the 
expected value of an inherently subjective variable, the latter is 
evaded taxes in order to be consistent with the 
U.S. practice. Since the evaded taxes depend on 
unreported income, the way this variable is con-
structed may introduce an error-in-variable bias. 
Therefore, we follow Durbin's (1954) approach for 
constructing an instrumental variable. This in-
volves ranking the sample in order of the variable 
measured with error and using this rank order as 
an instrument. Theory suggests that this variable 
will be negatively related to both Z1 and Z2 . 
Tax Rate, TR: Here we use a weighted average 
marginal tax rate constructed using a scheme sug-
gested by Wright (1969). This involves averaging 
the marginal rates in each year's tax schedule after 
weighting them by the percentage of total AGI in 
the corresponding tax bracket. As the discussion in 
section II indicates, the sign of this variable will 
depend on the associated income and substitution 
effects. However, some previous empirical work 
(Clotfelter, 1983) suggests that a positive sign may 
be expected. 
True Income, Y: Given that both versions of the 
dependent variable are based on the Adjusted 
Gap, the appropriate measure of true income is 
BEA AGI adjusted for the income of those not 
required to file or pay taxes. Because the inflation 
rate is included in the model as a separate vari-
able, we express true income in real terms. How-
ever, using Adjusted BEA AGI as an independent 
variable may produce a simultaneity bias. There-
fore, we instrument this variable by regressing it 
on all exogenous variables in the model, as well as 
the current and past values of the money stock 
and government expenditures. In general, a posi-
tive sign is expected in the case of Z 1, and a 
negative sign is expected in the case of Z 2 . 
Inflation Rate, P: Since most cost-of-living ad-
justment clauses are tied to the rate of change of 
the Consumer Price Index, we use this rate as our 
measure of the rate of inflation. 8 As indicated 
above, Arrow's Hypothesis of increasing relative 
risk aversion suggests that a positive sign may be 
expected for the coefficient of this variable. 
Institutional Variable, S: In the United States, 
some forms of income are more difficult to con-
ceal. For example, taxes on wages and salaries are 
an estimate of an objective variable whose value should, at least 
in principle, be known with certainty. 
8 We also used the GNP Deflator, and the consumption 
expenditures component of the Deflator. The results were 
consistent with those reported in section IV. 
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withheld at the source. As a result, the composi-
tion of income should affect underreporting. To 
capture this, we include the share of wages and 
salaries in national income in equation (2). We 
expect the sign on the coefficient of this variable to 
be negative. 
Time, t: This is added to control for the trend 
movements of Z1 and Z2 . Although desirable in 
time-series analysis, this often causes severe mul-
ticollinearity problems in aggregate analysis. This 
is particularly true in the present study, since the 
tax rate, real income, and the inflation rate have 
strong trends. To handle this problem, we de-
trended all independent variables prior to adding 
the time trend. 
IV. Estimation Results 
Both versions of equation (2) were estimated 
using the Cochrane-Orcutt second-order autore-
gressive procedure. From the figures reported in 
table 1, it is evident that our model successfully 
captures the aggregate evasion relationship. All 
relevant coefficients have the expected signs, and 
all but one are significant at the 0.05 level. The 
equations explain 97% and 87% of the variation in 
TABLE 1.-ESTIMATED EQUATIONS FOR AGGREGATE TAX 
EVASION IN THE UNITED STATES 
1947-1981 
( I-ratios in parentheses) 
Independent (2-1) (2-2) 
Variables Z1 Zz 
DI_ 0,1.2 -2.034 -0.006 
(-2.90) ( -0.122) 
F, -3.765 -0.059 
( -2.43) (-2.80) 
TRI 1.311 0.051 
(3.35) . (2.28) 
pl 0.577 0.137 
(2.12) (4.34) 
In Y, 58.299 -0.190 
(2.20) ( - 8.18) 
SI -3.306 -0.139 
( -2.97) ( - 3.38) 
6.145 -0.504 
(1.18) ( - 3.83) 
Constant -3.925 20.336 
( -0.03) (6.29) 
R2 0.967 0.872 
Rho1 1.73 -0.39 
(15.88) (- 3.10) 
Rho2 -0.78 -0.69 
( - 7.16) ( -5.48) 
Durbin-Watson 2.50 1.62 
Statistic 
the level of unreported income, Z1, and the pro-
portion of income not reported, Z2 , respectively. 
Consider first the compliance-policy-related 
variables, D, F, and S. As expected, all three are 
negatively related to Z1 and are significant. This is 
also true with Z2 , except that the detection prob-
ability is insignificant. Based on equation (2-1 ), 
increases in either the detection probability or the 
fine rate, on average, lead to lower underreporting. 
As a result, these two policy tools do appear to be 
substitutes. However, since the coefficient of detec-
tion probability is smaller than that of the fine rate 
in (2-1), and not significant in (2-2), it appears that 
this substitutability is less than perfect. Thus, no 
firm conclusions can be drawn regarding this 
matter. Furthermore, differences in implementa-
tion costs need to be considered. The negative sign 
of the coefficient of the wage and salary share 
variable confirms that automatic withholding is an 
effective compliance policy. 
In contrast, a positive sign is obtained for the 
tax rate. Our estimates indicate that increases in 
marginal tax rates not only lead to increases in the 
level of unreported income, Z1, but also to in-
creases in the proportion of income underreported, 
Z 2 . 9 This suggests that the income effect of a tax 
rate change either reinforces the substitution effect 
or is dominated by it. These results also provide 
some support for the proposition that cutting tax 
rates need not lead to a reduction in tax revenue. 
However, given the relatively small magnitudes of 
the coefficients, it is questionable whether the gain 
in revenue from reduced evasion would be large 
enough to offset the revenue loss due to lower tax 
rates. 
Next, consider the income variable. In (2-1) the 
coefficient of this variable is positive, as expected, 
suggesting that the level of underreporting is pro-
cyclical. As a result, it appears that the favorable 
effect of economic expansion on budget deficits 
will be at least partially neutralized by the revenue 
loss due to increased underreporting. In equation 
(2-2) the coefficient of the income variable is nega-
tive, as expected, which indicates that the propor-
tion of income not reported falls as income rises. 
When coupled with the results from (2-1), this 
9 We also used four other estimates of the tax rate taken from 
Barro and Sahasakul (1983). Their estimates using AGI as 
weights produced results comparable to those reported here. 
However, their estimates using the number of tax returns as 
weights did not perform as well. 
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suggests that underreporting increases with in-
come, but less than proportionately, as theory 
indicates. 
Turning to the inflation rate, a positive impact is 
clearly indicated on both Z1 and Z2 • Based on 
(2-1), a one percentage point increase in the infla-
tion rate generates nearly $600 million of ad-
ditional unreported income on an average annual 
basis. Using (2-2), the same one percentage point 
increase in the inflation rate results in a nearly 
0.14% increase in the proportion of income under-
reported. Increased underreporting, other things 
equal, means less tax revenues. As a result it 
appears that, subject to implementation cost con-
siderations, tax authorities may indeed want to 
increase their efforts during inflationary periods. 
Our finding that evasion is positively related to 
the inflation rate also has a bearing on the argu-
ment that inflation is a nonlegislated tax increase 
which enhances government revenues. Estimates of 
the elasticity of income tax revenue with respect to 
the inflation rate range from 1.5 to 1.9.10 But our 
results demonstrate that taxpayers, on average, 
respond to the inflation-induced tax increase by 
instituting their own nonlegislated tax cut through 
evasion. As a result, the net effect of inflation on 
tax revenues is not as large as the standard elastic-
ity estimates indicate. However, in light of the 
relatively small magnitudes of our parameter 
estimates, it seems likely that evasion-adjusted 
elasticity estimates would still be greater than unity. 
Finally, we note that while evasion has increased 
in absolute terms over time, it has declined in 
relative terms. This is evident from the positive, 
but weak, trend of the level of unreported income, 
and the strong negative trend of the proportion of 
income underreported. 
In general, our results support some of the 
findings of the theoretical literature on tax evasion. 
In addition, the results with respect to the tax rate, 
income, and the wage share are consistent with the 
cross-sectional findings of Clotfelter (1983). In view 
of the weaknesses associated with our evasion 
measure, the consistency with Clotfelter's findings 
is reassuring. This is because his analysis is at the 
micro level, and involves a more direct measure of 
evasion. As a result, we have more confidence in 
our aggregate time-series model in general, and in 
10 See Greytak and McHugh (1978), and the references cited 
therein. 
our finding regarding the effect of inflation in 
particular. This is important because, as fa~ as we 
know, no previous empirical evidence exists re-
garding the inflation-evasion relationship. 
V. Summary and Concluding Comments 
In this paper we presented an analysis of ag-
gregate tax evasion in the United States over the 
period 1947-81. We found that aggregate income 
tax evasion in both absolute and relative terms is 
positively related to the inflation rate. Further, our 
results indicated that aggregate evasion appears to 
have risen in absolute and relative terms with 
increases in the marginal tax rate, but to have 
fallen with increases in the detection probability, 
the penalty rate, and the wage share of income. 
Finally, evasion has risen in absolute terms but 
has fallen in relative terms when real true income 
has risen. 
The analysis presented in this paper can be 
extended in a number of directions. On theoretical 
grounds, work is needed on the bracket-creep 
channel of influence of inflation. From a policy 
standpoint, more detailed analysis of the implica-
tions for compliance and stabilization policies 
should be undertaken. With respect to compliance 
policy, attention should be devoted to estimating 
the net revenue effects of various policy changes, 
as well as to the sensitivity of various types of 
income to different policy actions. Similarly, in the 
case of stabilization policy, efforts should be 
directed toward determining the revenue effects of 
cutting taxes and fighting inflation. 
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